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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 20,1989, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously
adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child.1 The UNCRC entered intoforce on September 2, 1990, after having been ratified by the required number
of nations. 2 Today more than 140 nations have signed and/or ratified theConvention. 3 Such rapid and widespread accession to this human rightsdocument is strong evidence of the world-wide concern for children. No one
can listen to the increasing reports of child abuse or the killing or disabling of
children as a result of war, or the suffering caused by disease and hunger
without agreeing that children need protection. The issue is not whether
children need assistance.4 The issues instead are what form that assistance
should take, who will provide that help and against whom must this protection
be afforded.
To date, the United States of America is one of only a few nations that has
neither signed nor ratified the Convention.5 Amid abundant writing in favor
of ratification of the UNCRC, this note stands as a voice of caution. The purpose
of this writing is to examine the legal implications of incorporating the UNCRCinto the body of law in this country. While the Convention is certainly
aspirational, and the United States should indeed seek to improve the condition
of its children in many of the areas delineated, nonetheless, in the legal arena
of this country, a ratified UNCRC may lead to extremes which are destructive
of the family and thus detrimental to the children we seek to protect.
1Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20,1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. doc A/44/736 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989)[hereinafter Convention or UNCRC]. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is anoutgrowth of the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child. See Cynthia Price Cohen,Introductory Note, United Nations: Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448,1448 (1989). In honor of the Declaration's twentieth anniversary, 1989 was declared the
"International Year of the Child" and a proposal, initiated byPoland, pushed for a morelegally binding covenant which became the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Id.For a more comprehensive discussion of the history of the UNCRC, see Cynthia PriceCohen, The Human Rights of Children, 12 CAP. U. L. REV. 369 (1983).
2 CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
COMPARED wrrH UNITED STATES LAw iii (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson
eds., 1990).
3 State Parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Status of the Submission ofReports Under Article 44 of the Convention, U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child,4th Sess., at 1-7, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ 18 (19 9 3) [hereinafter Status ofReports]. As of July 15,1993, 144 countries had either acceded to or ratified the Convention. Id.
4 While it is true that "[niot every family is intact, nor does every family flourish...[still] the state should have a bias towards the family and family authority, and towardsthe right of every child to flourish within the family unit." James P. Lucier,Unconventional Rights: Children and the United Nations, FAMILY POLICY, Aug. 1992, at 15.
5 The United States, Iran, Iraq, and Somalia are among the remaining countries thathave neither signed nor ratified. Status of Reports, supra note 3, at 4,7.
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This note begins with an examination of why the UNCRC has yet to be
ratified in this country. The perspective of children's rights advocates is
discussed. A comparison of Romano-Germanic and common law is presented
to facilitate an understanding of the major differences that affect the way the
UNCRC is viewed under the two systems. The effect of a treaty, self-executing
or not, in United States' courts is examined. Civil Rights Articles 13, 14,15 and
16 in the Convention are linguistically analyzed and the United States law
applicable to each Article is reviewed for its compatibility with the UNCRC.
This note concludes with suggestions for two reservations 6 to protect against
extreme interpretations detrimental not only to the well-being of the family but
also the child.
II. U. S. HISTORICAL RELUCTANCE TO RATIFY THE UNCRC
To some commentators the failure of the United States to join in ratification
of the UNCRC is an embarrassment.7 Indeed, the fact that the United States
has failed to ratify key human rights treaties8 is a source of mortification to
many. There are several reasons suggested for why President George Bush
failed to send the UNCRC to the Senate for advice and consent. Among the
reasons cited are the lack of protection for the fetus9 and the prohibition against
6A reservation is defined as a "formal declaration by a [State Party] when signing,
ratifying, or adhering to a treaty, which modifies or limits the substantive effect of one
or more of the treaty provisions as between the reserving [State Party] and other [State
Parties] party to the treaty .... MARJORIE WHITEMAN, 14 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 17, at 137-38 (1970).
7 The failure of the Bush administration to sign the Convention on the Rights of the
Child has been described as "glaring" by Senator Christopher Dodd. Paul Taylor,
Senators Press Bush to Sign U.N. Children's Rights Treaty, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 19,
1991, at A21. Republican Senators Robert Dole, Richard Lugar and Mark Hatfield, in a
letter to President George Bush, expressed "'concern' that the United States is among a
small group of non-signers that includes Iran, Iraq, Libya, Ethiopia and South Africa."
Id.
8
"The only multilateral human rights treaties to which the United States is a party,
other than the United Nations Charter, are three conventions on slavery, the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women." Kathryn Burke et al., Application of International Human Rights Law in State and
Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291, 296-97 (1983).
9 Article 1 states that "[flor the purposes of the present Convention, a child means
every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to
the child, majority is attained earlier." UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1459. As
might be expected, the rights of an unborn child were hot issues during the drafting of
the Convention. Cohen, Introductory Note, supra note 1, at 1450. The language was
carefullyconstructed so that State Parties could attach theirownmeaning to thewording
"human being". Id. But, reflecting the intense controversy surrounding this issue, a
paragraph was added to the Preamble as a compromisewhich states that the child needs
special safeguards before as well as after birth. Id. (referring to UNCRC, supra note 1,
Preamble, 28 I.L.M. at 1458).
1994]
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the death penalty for those under eighteen years of age. 10 While these issues
are undoubtedly important, a State Department legal advisor suggests a more
basic reasoning:
[Tihe administration's main reservations center on states' rights issues
and a constitutional question of whether basic human rights in this
country can be guaranteed by an international treaty.
"In our constitutional form of government, we view basic rights as
limitations on the power of government to do things to the individual
rather than requirements that the government do things for people,"
said the official, who asked not to be identified.
11
This reasoning seems to explain, not only former President Bush's reticence in
regards to the UNCRC, but also this country's stance towards human rights
treaties in general.
Senator Bill Bradley stated his opinion that, "The haggling over the
peripheral legalisms really stems from a fear that the convention will oblige the
US to actually live up to its goals."12 The nucleus of the problem, however, may
be the conceptual differences that exist regarding what a "right" entails and
how that concept operates in the judicial arena in this country as opposed to
nations utilizing the Romano-Germanic system of law.
III. A COMPARISON OF ROMANO-GERMANIC AND COMMON LAW
Every Article of the Convention on the Rights of the Child contains
obligatory language that, to a common-law jurist, seems vague and over
broad.13 In an interrelated world it is only natural that problems of this sort
should arise when a multi-lateral treaty is drafted. There are at least two
systems of law functioning here. The differences between these systems must
be understood when considering the implications of the UNCRC. The
obligatory language of the UNCRC shows the strong influence of the Romanto-
1OAsk the Globe, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7,1992, § 3, at 22.
11Taylor, supra note 7.
12 Bil Bradley, Why is the US Ignoring the World's Children?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 4, 1992, at 18. While this note focuses on the civil rights provisions of the
UNCRC, there are a variety of social and economic provisions incorporated into the
UNCRC which might well obligate the United States to dramatically shift federal and
state budgetary allocations in order to be in compliance with the UNCRC. For example,
the Convention addressing the need for day-care facilities, obligates State Parties to
"ensure the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children."
UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 18, § 2, 28 I.L.M. at 1463. Additionally, the Convention states
that "States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of
his or her right of access to such health care services." Id. art. 24, § 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1465.
13 Lucier, supra note 4, at 7.
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Germanic family of law.14 Originating in the great universities of Europe, the
law was formed by scholars seeking to answer the question: what is justice?' 5
They sought the ideal answer; law became not a set of cumulative, practical
decisions, but a lofty aspiration. 16 This family conceives of law as broad
principles of conduct tied intrinsicly to concepts of justice and morality.17
Continually formulated by legal scholars who are focused on the principle
rather than actual administration, the law is a living doctrine extracted by
scholars from judicial and extra-judicial practices.18 This process of extraction
and consideration leads to the articulation of a rule general enough to provide
a framework for future concrete cases. 19 The judge, thus, does not formulate
legal rules as do judges in the common law;20 nor are they required to follow
precedent.21 The judge applies the general principles to the situation at hand
in order to arrive at a just result.22
Furthermore, the law has developed primarily as a system of private law; that
is the regulation of the private relationships between individuals.23 Public law,
less developed, is the relationship between those who govern and those who
are governed.24 Romano-Germanic tradition separates the two in the belief that
141d.
151d. at 8.
161d. at 9. The use of the phrase '"best interests of the child" in Article 3 of the
Convention is an example of the way that the Romano-Germanic law has found its way
into, not only the UNCRC, but United States' common law as well. The wide-spread
use of the concept, without any precise legal definition suggests that this is an
aspirational guide to be applied to the specific dilemmas in the Romano-Germanic
tradition. See infra note 94.
17RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 22
(3d ed. 1985). Romano-Germanic jurists do not comprehend a separation between law
and equity as does the common law. The law, separate from equity, was not considered
law. Id. at 45-46. The law of obligations, is a central part of Romano-Germanic law; an
obligation being "the duty of one person ... to do or not to do something to the benefit
of another person.... Id. at 86.
181d. at 22, 95. In a similar manner the Convention provides for the use of
organizations such as UNICEF to aid in implementing the treaty. UNCRC, supra note
1, art. 45, § (a), 28 I.L.M. at 1474. From these organizations, the Committee will receive
information which will be used to help interpret and clarify the text of the Convention
while assisting States Parties towards compliance. Id.
19 DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 17, at 95.
20 Id.
21id.
22 1d. at 125.
23 Id. at 22.
24 DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 17, at 81.
19941
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"the public interest and the interest of private individuals cannot be weighed
in the same balance."25
It should be apparent from this discussion that United States' common law
approaches the aspiration of justice from the opposite end of the spectrum. Law
is not the lofty aspiration, but the nitty-gritty means utilized in moving towards
the just end. It is made up of countless decisions, building one upon the other
as precedent. The "law" is also derived from the Constitution or legislative
provisions in accordance with the Constitution. All three
sources--Constitution, legislation, and judicial decision-comprise the "law of
the land". Thus, the common law is much less abstract than Romano-Germanic
law. 26 In the United States the judge determines the "law" in a civil case, and
future cases, to the extent that the facts are sufficiently similar, are expected to
apply the same rule of law (provided of course that the rule of law comports
with the Constitution).
These different concepts of "Law" produce different expectations among the
citizenry:
The common law citizen believes that a man's home is his castle, within
which he is secure from state intervention; the civil law
[Romano-Germanic] citizen concedes to the state the duty to organize
a just society. For the one, justice is the prevention of state oppression;
for the other, justice is the orderly distribution of social benefits, both
material and intangible.
27
Law: the aspiration of justice-law: the uniform rule and procedure aimed
at justice; justice: prevention of state oppression-justice: distribution of
material and intangible social benefits; it is because of these profound
differences that care must be exercised when a common law country considers
implementing a treaty or convention whose provisions derive from
Romano-Germanic tradition.
IV. AN ADVOCATE'S VIEW OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
To understand the possible implications of ratification of the UNCRC, it is
important to look at the children's rights movement. While no one advocates
anything but that which they conceive to be best for our children, there are two
diametrically opposed viewpoints as to how that "best" should be achieved.
"The difference has to do with control and where it ultimately resides-with
the child or with the parent."28
2 5Id.
261d. at 24.
27Lucier, supra note 4, at 7.
28HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 20-21 (1980).
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Dr. James P. Lucier, former minority staff director for the United States
Foreign Relations Committee, capsulized the viewpoint of those who advocate
family/parental rights:
The family, too, has rights, and these rights may be asserted against the
state on behalf of the child. The child has the right to be nurtured in
the intimate existence of the family, and the family has the right to do
the nurturing.... Despite the deficiencies that may be found in all
human endeavors, society and tradition have uniformly held that the
enjoyment of family rights with the maximum of non-interference by
the state is essential to the well-being of the people.
29
In contrast, Richard Farson, a noted children's rights advocate, "makes
self-determination the basic right: 'Children should have the right to decide
matters that effect them most directly.' Whatever is needed to make this
possible-to reduce the control that adults have over the lives of children...
would [be] specif[ied] as a child's right."30 To be fair, Howard Cohen does
identify Farson's Child's Bill of Rights as "radical proposals", but he states that
they are the radical proposals of a "hopeless idealist".31
Given these statements, it is not too difficult to foresee that children would
seek outside support to enforce their UNCRC "rights", not only against a
government that infringed upon them, but against parents who seek to exert
parental authority over the decisions and actions of their minor children. And,
of course, that is precisely what some enthusiasts would advocate. Child's
rights activists seek nothing less than the restructuring of "existing social
29 Lucier, supra note 4, at 11.
30 COHEN, supra note 28, at 13. Mr. Farson's list of nine "rights" advocates among other
things that, "[C]hildren should be able to choose from among a variety of [alternate home
environments such as] residences operated by children, child-exchange programs,
twenty-four hour child-care centers, and various kinds of schools and employment
opportunities." Id. The list also includes a child's "right to all information ordinarily
available to adults-including, and perhaps especially, information that makes adults
uncomfortable... [and the freedom] to design their own education, choosing from
among many options, the kinds of learning experiences they want, including the option
not to attend any kind of school." Id. (quoting Richard Farson, A Child's Bill of Rights, in
THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOvEMENT 325-28 (Beatrice and Ronald Gross, eds. 1977)).
311d. at 14. Cohen's definition of a right is more general:
[It is] the situation in which I am entitled to do or have something. My
action is not dependent upon the discretion of others. It has been decided
in advance-by law or through custom-that I may engage in certain
activities or have certain things without regard for the wishes, desires, or
approval of others. I need not ask anyone in order to do what I am entitled
to do; nor are their objections to my doing it relevant.
Id. at 19. When one has a right, that entitlement has a status that means "one may appeal
to others for support if one's rights are being denied. In effect the child may call upon
an outsider ... or even the law-to enforce a right." Id. at 22.
19941
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relationships so that children will be treated in new and more satisfactory
ways."32
Perhaps there are some who think that child-rights activists can not possibly
mean really young children, children who lack the capacity necessary to wisely
exercise any given right. But in fact all children from birth to age eighteen
would be "liberated" utilizing a plan of children's agents who would enable the
child to exercise his/her rights.33 The agent's role is conceived as being
advisory:
[Their role] would be to supply information in terms which the child
could understand, to make the consequences of the various courses of
action a child might take clear to the child, and to do what is necessary
to see that the right in question is 
actually exercised.
3
'
To most people, this would appear to be the role that parent's are and should
be accorded. But, because of what advocates see as possible conflicts of interest
between the parent and child, this agent, in most cases, would not be the
parent.3 5
Should the UNCRC be ratified in this country, and thereby become part of
the supreme law of the land, it will undoubtedly be used in an effort to enact
and judicially interpret legislation in accordance with the views of children's
rights advocates.
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U. S. COURTS
A. Generally
The United States Constitution states that a properly ratified treaty shall be
a part of "the supreme Law of the Land."
36 Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton,3 7 stands for the proposition that a treaty is secondary to the provi-
321d. at 36.
33 1d. at 59-60.
3 4 COHEN, supra note 28, at 60.
35 1d. at 79.
36U. S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Article VI states in full:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. A strict reading of this Article would give the impression that the Constitution,
congressional legislation and treaties are on a par with each other. 
What has emerged
however, is that the Constitution is the supreme Law of the Land; 
congressional
legislation is open to judicial review for its constitutionality. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.
S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803).
37361 U. S. 234 (1960).
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sions of the United States Constitution.38 When a treaty provision is in
opposition to a federal statute, whichever is the most recent prevails. 39 A treaty
will always control over state law.40 In general, courts are to construe treaties
"in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one
restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to
them, the latter is to be preferred."
41
This seems very straight forward. When considered in light of human rights
treaties and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in particular however,
a problem arises. If the civil rights provisions of the UNCRC are construed
broadly and in light of the Romano-Germanic influence, it must be said that
many children's civil rights are enforceable against individuals, notably
parents, as well as the state. The United States would thus be placed in the
position of either enforcing or legislating protection which is beyond the scope
permitted by either explicit or interpreted stipulations of the Constitution.42 To
38 1d. at 249 (holding that a valid international agreement which gave a military court
the right to court-martial a civilian dependent could not be enforced against a civilian
because of her overriding constitutional right to a trial). Exactly what is meant by
"constitutional provisions" is somewhat unclear. Kinsella dealt with a conflict between
an explicit constitutional provision and an international agreement. This may be taken
to mean that only explicit constitutional stipulations take precedence over treaties.
3 9Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 18 n.34 (1957) (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S.
190, 194 (1888)).
40Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,440-41 (1968). Of particular interest in this regard
is Article 37 of the UNCRC which states, "Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed
by persons below eighteen years of age." UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 37, § (a), 28 I.L.M.
at 1470. The United States Supreme Court has upheld, as constitutional, state
death-penalty statutes affecting persons over the age of sixteen when the crime was
committed. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 (1989). Under the Convention, as written,
such statutes would fail.
41 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 342 (1924).
42 This note does not even consider the ramifications of federalism which has been
suggested as a major impediment to ratification of human rights treaties in general.
LawrenceL. Stentzel, I,Federal-StateImplications of the Convention, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
N AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED
STATES LAw 57 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990). In a 1920
decision, Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court stated that whatever is within the treaty
power of the United States is not reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 252
U. S. 416, 424 (1920). "Matters customarily regulated by state law domestically are
nevertheless subject to the treaty power of the President and the Senate so far as
international agreements are concerned." Stentzel, supra at 61-62. Under the Necessary
and Proper Clause of the Constitution, legislation which is necessary to effectuate treaty
provisions is a function of the federal government regardless of whether the action was
once reserved to the state. Missouri, 252 U. S. at 432. This would seem to make a
federal-state reservation unnecessary, at least if you were so inclined to further erode
reserved states rights. That Congress is not ready to permit this erosion is evidenced by
the expectation that it will attach a federal-state reservation to the Convention should
it be asked for advice and consent. Stentzel, supra at 57; see also Elizabeth M. Calciano,
19941
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overcome this potential problem, a specific reservation, attached at time of
ratification, may be required.
B. The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties
International treaties to which the United States is a party are subject to the
doctrine of self-executing treaties.43 A clause that is considered self-executing
enables individuals to challenge a violation of those provisions in federal or
state courts.44 In general, a clause is determined to be self-executing if, by the
wording and intent of the drafters, the clause requires no implementing
legislative action to bring it into force.45 For example: Article 13 of the UNCRC
states, "The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.
.. "46 The wording is clear. The child is to be accorded these rights without any
action required on the part of the State Party. In contrast, Article 19 states,
"States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental
violence, injury or abuse ... ."47 The Convention's various Articles having to
do with children's economic rights can also be interpreted as
non-self-executing. 48
Note, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Will It Help Children in the United
States?, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 515, 520-21 (1992).
43 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
44Burke, supra note 8, at 301. In addition to the direct enforcement of a ratified treaty
as modified by the self-executing treaty doctrine, courts may use treaties that have not
been ratified by the U. S. as enforceable "customary international law". Id. at 315-16
(citing Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980), which held that torture
by a public official is a violation of customary international law). Courts may also use
treaties in force among other nations to aid in the interpretation of rights or protections
under state or federal law. Id. at 322-23 (citing Sterling v. Culp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 n.21
(Or. 1981), which utilized the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration and
the ICCPR to define the treatment of prisoners).
45Id. at 302. One legal scholar has proposed a three-step inquiry for determining
when a provision is in fact self-executing.
a) Whether the rights and duties of individuals are involved; b) whether
the United States and other parties retain discretion to determine whether
and when to fulfill the obligation to give the words of the treaty domestic
effect; and c) whether congressional action is required to fulfill the treaty
obligation.
Id. (citing Stefan Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable
German Judgment, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 550 (1971)).
46 UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 13, § 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1462.
471d. art. 19, § 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1463.
48 Wording such as "States Parties shall strive to ensure..." indicates that legislative
action is expected, the key word being strive. The need for legislative action is also clear
when a Party's duty is defined by such language as "to take appropriate measures".
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In all likelihood, the United States, if it chooses to ratify the UNCRC, will
attach a reservation stating that the Convention is, as a whole,
non-self-executing.4 9 The attachment of this reservation may have some
opposition, not only within the United States, but also from other States Parties.
Article 51 section 2 states, "A reservation incompatible with the object and
purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted."50 The language of
two of the civil rights provisions of the UNCRC clearly indicates an intention
that the child be accorded the rights subject only to expressed limitations; to
require-additional legislation runs counter to the objectives.51 It has been
suggested, however, that the United States will justify a non-self-executing
reservation by stating that it merely places the United States on equal footing
with other countries that require legislation to implement treaty provisions.5 2
VI. A GUIDE TO TREATY LANGUAGE
Prior to beginning an analysis of specific treaty provisions, it will be helpful
to become acquainted with the hierarchy that exists in treaty obligatory
language. 53 The highest level of obligation is an absolute statement of right.54
Just below this is the positive statement of right which is qualified by limitation
clauses.55 In descending order of obligation come the obligatory words: ensure
(assure), respect and recognize. 56 When a State Party is to "ensure" a right, the
Calciano, supra note 42, at 527. See, e.g., UNCRC supra note 1, art. 24, § 1, 28 I.L.M at 1465;
UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 27, § 3, 28 I.L.M. at 1467.
4 9Calciano, supra note 42, at 529.
50UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 51, § 2, 28 I.L.M. at 1476.
S1UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 13, § 1 and art. 16, § 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1462.
52 Calciano, supra note 42, at 529 (suggesting that such a reservation would place the
United States in the same position as Great Britain).
53This discussion is an overview of the general principles of treaty obligations. A full
interpretation of the specific Convention language will be done by the Committee on
the Rights of the Child utilizing the "travaux preparatoire" (literally preparatory works;
similar to a legislative history) as a guide of the framers intent. Cynthia Price Cohen, A
Guide to Linguistic Interpretation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter
Linguistic Interpretation, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAw 33-34 (Cynthia Price Cohen
& Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990). In addition, the Committee will be able to consider
developing theories of child development and individual rights when attempting to
interpret the text of the Convention. Id. at 49. The Committee may also utilize the input
from non-governmental organizations who have been accorded a role in implementing
the UNCRC. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the language of the Convention, see
generally Cynthia Price Cohen, Elasticity of Obligation and the Drafting of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 71 (1987).
54Cohen, Linguistic Interpretation, supra note 53, at 35.
551d. at 38.
561d. at 35.
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government is required "to take positive measures, legislative and otherwise,
to make sure that the right can be effectively exercised."57 At the other end of
the scale, when a State Party is to "recognize" a right, it is obligated to merely
"refrain from obstructing exercise of the protected right."58 "Respect" finds its
place somewhere between the two meanings.5 9 The word "shall", attached to
any of the aforementioned obligatory words, raises the basic level of obligation
while the word "undertakes", when coupled with an obligation, lessens that
burden somewhat.60 It is important to keep this hierarchy in mind when trying
to determine which right will take precedence over another when the treaty is
interpreted.
VII. PARENTAL AUTHORrrY: THE UNCRC AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Parental Rights and the UNCRC
Article 5 is the primary provision in the Convention for recognition of the
parental role in child rearing:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of
parents or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or
community as provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other
persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights
recognized in the present Convention.
61
Furthermore, the UNCRC specifically couples a recognition of parental
authority with Article 14: "freedom of thought, conscience and religion."62
This obligation level in this Article is designated as "shall respect".63 All
subsequent discussions of children's rights will compare the obligation level
of this Article with that of other Articles which accord various civil rights.
B. Parental Rights and the Constitution
The Constitution does not explicitly address parental rights. A "private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter,"64 has been judicially developed,
571d. at 35 (directing the reader to: Buergenthal, To Respect and Ensure: State
Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 77-78 (L.
Henkin, ed. 1981)).
58 Id.
5 9Cohen, Linguistic Interpretation, supra note 53, at 35.
6 0 1d. at 36.
61UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 5,28 I.L.M. at 1459-60.
6 2UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 14, § 2,28 I.L.M. at 1462.
63 See discussion supra part VI.
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however. In Ginsberg v. New York65 the Court wrote that "constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society."66 This "realm" includes family relationships, 67 and
child rearing and education. 68
It is also clear, however, that parental authority is not without limitation; the
"private realm" is not sacrosanct. The state may utilize either its parens patriae
power69 or its police powerO to limit "parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare [including] to some extent, matters of conscience
6 4Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944). While stating that there is a
private realm which the state cannot enter, the Court nonetheless decided that where
the state acted to protect a child's well being, itcould restrict the parent's control through
child labor laws.
65390 U. S. 629 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited
the sale of 'obscene' material to persons under the age of seventeen).
66Id. at 639.
67 prince, 321 U. S. at 166.
68 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents could
choose to send their children to private schools); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S.
205 (1972) (invalidating a statute as against Amish parents which would require the
parents to send their children to school through the age of sixteen); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U. S. 390, 400 (1923) (in the context of whether a state could forbid the teaching of
modern foreign language, the Court stated that, "[c]orresponding to the right of control,
it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station
in life").
69 Parens patriae is defined as:
[L]iterally "parent of the country," [it] refers traditionally to [the] role of
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as
juveniles or the insane... It is the principle that the state must care for
those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper
care and custody from their parents.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). The United States Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has stated:
[Plarents have a substantial constitutional right, as head of the family unit,
to direct and control the upbringing and development of their minor child-
ren. If the parental decisions amount to abuse or neglect of the minor child
then the parental right is no longer constitutionally protected, and the state,
as parens patriae, may intervene to protect the child. Absent a showing of
abuse or neglect, however, the parental right remains substantial and may
be subject to governmental interference only when such interference is
support by a significant governmental interest.
Haldermanex rel. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702,709 (3d Cir.
1983)).
70The dictionary defines the "police power" as, "The power of the State to place
restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of
the public safety, health, and morals..." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
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and religious conviction."71 In prior Court decisions this has included, among
other things, the state's ability to regulate or prohibit child labor.72
The Convention provides, in all sections discussing parental authority, that
the authority is to be exercised "consistent with the evolving capacities of the
child."73 Thus, under the UNCRC, the private realm, which the state could not
enter except for compelling reasons, would now be open to scrutiny to assure
that parents are permitting their children to exercise rights in accordance with
the UNCRC.
This weakening of parental authority can be expected to have two serious
consequences. First, "parents would be more reluctant to provide for their
children the kind of early training that now appears to be necessary for
responsible and moral behavior later."74 Second, "adolescents would be less
likely to take their parents' guidance seriously."75 It is reasonable to expect that
the child's well-being and his or her ability to effectively participate in society
will be adversely affected by these consequences. 76 Aparent is in a much better
position than the state, or even an agent appointed for the child, to determine
when a particular child is ready to assume new rights and corresponding
responsibilities.
VIII. RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE UNCRC
A. Children's Rights Under the Constitution
In the same way that the Constitution is silent as to parental authority, so it
also is silent as to children. 77 However, subsequent case law has certainly
affected children's interests even when it did not specifically address their
rights. 78
7 1Prince, 321 U. S. at 167.
72 Id. at 166 (citing and Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320 (1913)).
73 See UNCRC, supra note 1, arts. 5, 14, 28 I.L.M. at 1460, 1462.
7 4 LAURA M. PuRDY, IN THEIR BEST INTEREST? 214 (1992). Ms. Purdy argues that
appropriate parental authority is weakened by "severing the asymmetrical legal ties that
now bind parents and children .... Id.
7 51d.
7 61d.
7 7Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1. While the
actual reasons for this can not be discerned with complete accuracy, Clark suggests that
"it never occurred to the Framers that children, as distinguished from adults, needed
constitutional status. The assumption may well have been that common-law parental
power and authority over children, reinforced by parental affection and concern, were
sufficient to protect the children's interests." Id. at 2.
7 8Cases influenced children and their rights both positively and negatively. During
the period known as the Industrial Revolution, a congressional attempt to protect
children through a child labor law was held to be unconstitutional in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918). Additionally, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
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In 1967 the Court took a major step toward recognizing general fundamental
rights for children in a case involving a minor's procedural due process rights.
The Court, in In re Gault, specifically stated that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 79
Gault was followed in 1969 by Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,80 which stated explicitly that, "Students in school as well as out
of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must
respect their obligations to the State."81
The Court has, however, indicated on several occasions that the
constitutional rights of children are not equal to those of adults. The decision
in Prince v. Massachusetts stated that the "power of the state to control the
conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults .... 82
The reasons for this were discussed in Bellotti v. Baird,83stating,
"[C]onstitutional principles [should] be applied with sensitivity and flexibility
to the special needs of parents and children."84 The Court indicated three
reasons why children's constitutional rights should not, at all times, be equal
to adults: the vulnerability of children, their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed and mature way, and the parent's important role in child
rearing.85 The Court also has permitted the "special characteristics of the school
environment" to act as a limitation on certain First Amendment rights of
students.86
The rights available to children under the UNCRC are more extensive than
those available under our Constitution. Whereas the Constitution permits state
interference with rights when appropriate, the concept of parents'
constitutionally interfering with their children's rights has not been addressed
in the area of basic civil rights.
294 (1955), though not a children's rights case, certainly promised great benefit to
children's educational rights. Clark, supra note 77, at 3.
79387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967). The action involved a juvenile who was arrested, jailed and
after two hearings was committed to a state industrial school. In reviewing the
procedure under which the child had been prosecuted, the U. S. Supreme Court found
that he had been denied a number of procedural due process rights including a right to
notice, a right to counsel, including the right to have counsel appointed, and a right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 33-34, 41, 55.
80393 U. S. 503 (1969).
81id. at 511.
82321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944).
83443 U. S. 622 (1979).
84 Id. at 634.
85Id.
86Tinker, 393 U. S. at 506.
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B. Children's Rights Under the UNCRC Article 13: Freedom of Expression
Article 13 of the UNCRC states:
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of the child's choice.
2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by
law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or
(b) For the protection of national security or of public
order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.87
1. Linguistic Consideration
It is significant to note that the Article does not begin with standard
obligatory wording. Rather this Article, begins with the statement, "The child
shall have the right to freedom of expression ...,88 A right stated in this form
carries a strong obligation.89 It is, however, not the highest level of obligation
because Section 2 of the Article contains certain limitations to the right.90 The
exception of section 2(a) is similar to the slander and libel exceptions
recognized in this country.91 Section 2(b) lists limitations that are meant to
afford protection to the state and community. The word "public" means
"proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire
community."92 Understood in this manner, the limitations circumscribe
expression which would affect the whole community.93 A limitation on
87UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 13, §§ 1-2,28 I.L.M. at 1462.
8 81d. art. 13, § 1, 28 I.L.M. 1462.
89See discussion supra part VI.
90Cohen, Linguistic Interpretation, supra note 53, at 38.
91Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Civil Rights of the Child, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA:
U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAw 138
(Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990). Slander and libel are both
forms of defamation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1388 (6th ed. 1990). Slander involves the
speaking of base/defamatory words prejudicial to the reputations of others. Id. Libel is
the written counterpart. Id. The exceptions under Article 13(2)(a) also recognize the need
for respect of other's reputations and would limit a child's expressive rights accordingly.
9 2 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (6th ed. 1990).
9 3Law in the United States outlines situations when free expression may be
circumscribed to protect the public order. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court stated that
advocacy which "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action," may be proscribed. 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969).
Ordre public is a french term which stands for "the sense of the proper disposition of all
matters affecting the public weal, including the orderly relationships of citizen to citizen
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expression for the protection of an individual child's moral development does
not seem to be encompassed within the language of this Article.94
2. Current U. S. Law-Freedom to Express Oneself
There are two aspects of this article which must be analyzed separately:
freedom to express oneself and freedom of access to information. This section
deals with the former. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District95 is an important case frequently cited when deliberating a child's right
to free expression. Tinker involved a situation where the wearing of an arm band
was prohibited by school officials. Noting the need to balance a student's rights
against the recognized rights of school authorities to prescribe and control
conduct in the school, the Court stated that "where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and sub-
and citizen to state." Lucier, supra note 4, at 7. Note the major differences in meaning
ascribed to the two concepts. It does not seem accidental that the UNCRC couples the
English wording "public order" with the French "ordre public". To the citizen reared
under the common law, the State's involvement in the "orderly relationships" of private
individuals seems very intrusive.
941t is important to state that whether an action is in the child's best interest will
always be considered. Article 3, section 1 states:
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consid-
eration.
UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 3, § 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1459. Exactly what is encompassed by the
"best interests of the child" is not clear. Family advocates will necessarily argue that the
child's best interests lie within a strong family structure. Dr. Lucier states, 'The overall
bias of the courts in interpreting this rule has been to presume that the best interests of
the child are determined by the family." Lucier, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Michele D.
Sullivan,From Warren to Rehnquist: The Growing Conservative Trend in the Supreme Court's
Treatment of Children, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1139 (1991)). The Child Rights advocates will
argue that the child is better able to determine his own best interests.
Even with as broad and inconcise as it is, the "best interests" criteria has found its
way into numerous court opinions and state and federal statutes. Jane Ellis, The Best
Interests of the Child, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTSIN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ONTHE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD COMPARED wrrH UNITED STATES LAw 4 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard
A. Davidson eds., 1990). "It embodies an aspiration against which policy and doctrine
must be measured as the law grapples with specific dilemmas .... Id. Given that the
"best interests of the child" can be argued either way, it is too vague to adequately factor
into this discussion.
95393 U. S. 503 (1969). Public high school officials, aware of student plans to protest
the Vietnam war by wearing black arm bands to school, instituted a policy forbidding
students to wear arm bands upon threat of suspension. The wearing of arm bands for
the purpose of expressing a viewpoint is a type of symbolic act that is within the First
Amendment protection of free speech and is, in fact, closely analogous to 'pure speech'
which the Court has repeatedly held to be entitled to comprehensive protection. Id. at
505.
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stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school,' prohibition cannot be sustained. '96
The holding in Tinker is consistent with the UNCRC. A young person's right
to express his/her viewpoint, symbolically, is affirmed but is potentially
circumscribed by the right of the state, in the entity of school authorities, to
protect the public order (ordrepublic): here, school discipline. But, the limitation
on freedom of expression to protect the public order as applied in a school
setting is more constrained than that which would be permitted an adult in a
public setting. 97
Whereas the language in Tinker is expansive, subsequent decisions in Bethel
School District v. Fraser98 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier99 indicate
that other forms of student expression are more limited. In Fraser, the Court
narrowed expressive rights when it permitted sanctions against a student for
using graphic sexual innuendo in a nominating speech for a fellow student at
a school assembly.100 The Court stated that a school did not have to tolerate
student speech that was inconsistent with the "basic educational mission" of
the school.101
The Court in Kuhlmeier dealt with the question of whether a student
newspaper, published as part of a journalism class, was a public forum
protected by First Amendment free speech rights.102 Analysis of the
environment in which the paper was published, the school board's published
policy and the curriculum guide for the high school led the Court to conclude
that the paper was not a public forum.103 According to the Court, educators
may exercise greater control over school-sponsored expressive activities.
Specifically, as publisher of a student newspaper, a school may prevent speech
that: substantially interferes with the school's work; impinges upon the rights
of other students; is poorly written, prejudiced, vulgar, profane or unsuitable
for immature audiences; or that might be perceived to advocate conduct (such
as drug use or sexual behavior) that is not in keeping with "the shared values
of a civilized social order."104
9 61d. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
9 7 See supra text accompanying note 93.
98478 U. S. 675 (1986).
99484 U. S. 260 (1988). The school principal prevented the student newspaper from
publishing a story about three, anonymous students' experiences with pregnancy with
references to sexual activity and birth control as well as a story on the impact of divorce
in one student's family which included comments derogatory to a family member. Id.
at 262.
lOOBethel, 478 U. S. at 680.
10ld. at 685.
102 Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. at 267.
103 d. at 270.
104 d. at 271-72 (quoting Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 683 (1986)).
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In so far as Fraser and Kuhlmeier reflect exceptions to the right of free
expression in order to protect the rights and reputations of others or the public
order or public morals they are consistent with the UNCRC. It is questionable
whether material that is simply poorly written or prejudiced would be
excepted. Likewise, alleging that an expression "substantially interferes with
the school's work", would not be sufficiently specific to warrant exception by
the terms of this Article of the UNCRC.
The free expression of ideas within a family is basic to the mental
development of the child. It is in the interchange of ideas between parent and
child that the child's belief system is initially formed. However, parents must
have the authority to curtail this exchange when it involves expression deemed
by the parents to have an adverse effect upon the safety or moral development
of the child. As described previously, Article 5,105 which is often held up as the
UNCRC's recognition of parental authority, indicates that State Parties shall
respect the parental right to direct and guide their children in the exercise of
his/her rights.106 The more assertive language of Article 13 presumably means
that Article 13 would prevail where there is a conflict between the child's desire
to freely express herself and the parent's interest in curbing that expression. As
expression encompasses much more than mere speech, it is conceivable that a
young person wishing to express himself in a demonstrative way would be
able to assert his right over a parent's prohibition even where that prohibition
was predicated on a concern for the child's safety. When considered in light of
the rights advanced by child advocates, the interpretation of the Convention
that will be argued in the courts, is that the parent may act as counselor,
suggesting the pros and cons and possible consequences, but the final choice
would be in the hands of the child.
3. Current U. S. Law-Freedom of Access to Information
Consistent with the spirit of the First Amendment, the State may not limit
the "spectrum of available knowledge"; free speech includes "not only the right
to utter or to print, but.., the right to receive.., and [the] freedom of inquiry."107
When dealing with children, however, the Court has made it clear that the State
may exert greater control over a child's conduct than it could over an adult's.108
105UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 5, 28 I.L.M. at 1459-60.
106The word "direct" means, "To point to; guide; order; command; instruct. To advise;
suggest; request." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 459 (6th ed. 1990). By this definition, a parent
could order or command a child to refrain from detrimental speech.
10 7Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 249-50, 261-63 (1957)). The Court noted that the specific
guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights have penumbras which help to give the
amendments life and substance and are necessary to make the explicit guarantees
meaningful. Id. at 483.
108Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1943). In Ginsberg v. New York, the
Supreme Court noted, "The world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of
free expression. The factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose
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One of the earliest cases dealing with a child's access to knowledge was
Meyer v. Nebraska.109 The case centered on a Nebraska statute which forbade
the teaching of a modem foreign language to children who had not passed the
eighth grade.n ° The Court, taking into consideration the State's alleged interest
in fostering a homogeneous people, found that such an attempt materially
interferred "with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge... ."111
In 1968, the Supreme Court reached a decision involving the legality of
selling obscene material to children under the age of seventeen. 112 The Court
rejected appellants argument that it was an unconstitutional deprivation of
protected liberty to forbid access to material to those under seventeen when it
is available to those over seventeen. 113 Reaching the opinion, the Court stated
that the well-being of children is definitely a subject within the constitutional
power of a State to regulate.114 Notably, the Court stated that parents, teachers,
and others who are responsible for the well-being of children are entitled to the
support of laws designed to aid them in the fulfillment of this responsibility.115
A more recent case involved a child's right to receive information through
the vehicle of his/her school library.1l 6 Reiterating that the First Amendment
encompasses a right to receive information, the Court stated that the school
environment was especially appropriate one in which to recognize the First
Amendment rights of students.117 Furthermore, the Court restated its opinion
in Barnette, "that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... "118 Thus, the
different rules." 390 U. S. at 639 n.6 (citing Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877,938-39 (1963)).
109262 U. S. 390 (1923).
1101d. at 390.
111Id. at 401. The Court also found that the statute materially interfered with the
parents' right to control the education of their children. Id.
112Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968).
1131d. at 636-37. The Court again made note that the State may constitutionally restrict
distribution of some material to children which is otherwise available to adults. Id. at
636 (citing Lockhard & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960)).
1141d. at 639. The Court considered a psychiatrist's report which indicated that during
the period of youth behavior patterns and a working sense of self are established and
legalized pornography during this period may be damaging to the developing ego. Id.
at 643 n.10.
115Id.
116 Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853
(1982).
117 Id. at 868.
1181d. at 870 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barmette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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final determination of whether the school could constitutionally remove books
from the library depended upon the school board's motivation for doing so.119
Where the state seeks to restrict a child's freedom of access to information,
the Court requires that it demonstrate a special interest. The interest,
apparently, does not have to be compelling as would be necessary if an adult's
freedom were being restricted. The language of this Article seemingly permits
the same type of evaluation; it states that any regulation must be necessary.
Aside from libel and slander considerations, the UNCRC, however, would only
permit necessary restrictions which are based on the national or public welfare.
Under this interpretation, Meyer v. Nebraska would be found to be in accordance
with the UNCRC. Fostering a homogeneous people is not necessary in the
name of national security. Ginsberg's concern for the developmental well-being
of the child most likely would be in accordance with the objects of the UNCRC
if that concern is couched in terms of protecting public morals.
Pico runs into problems with UNCRC Article 13. The Court suggests that
materials which are educationally unsuitable or "pervasively vulgar" may be
kept from school library shelves. This seems to run counter to the intent of the
Article. The Pico Court is in accord, however, when it states that materials may
not be restricted based solely upon the ideas advanced.
There are many interwoven considerations involved in Article 13. Courts in
the United States appear to be, for the most part, on the correct path. Of course
only cases involving action by the state come before our courts for review under
the Constitution. The real difficulty arises when a child is permitted to assert
rights as against a parent instead of the state. It is not at all clear from the
interrelationship between various Articles or any of the exceptions, that the
parents' notion of what is in their child's best interest will be determinative.
C. Children's Rights Under the UNCRC Article 14: Freedom of Thought,
Conscience and Religion
Article 14 of the UNCRC states:
1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion.
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide
direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.120
1191d. at 871. Decisions predicated upon whether a book was educationally suitable
or whether the book was "pervasively vulgar" would not be in violation of the
Constitution because there is no attempt to officially suppress ideas. Id.
120UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 14,28 I.L.M. 1462.
1994]
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
1. Linguistic Consideration
Article 14 utilizes the mid-level obligatory words "shall respect".121 Section
2 uses the exact same wording in obligating States Parties to respect the rights
and duties of parents/guardians in providing direction to their children, at
least so far as that direction is in keeping with the child's evolving capacities.
This is in contrast to Article 13 where the parental right, as applied through
Article 5, seemed to be subordinated to the child's right to express himself and
seek information. The language of Article 14 was a carefully constructed
compromise worked out by the drafters in cooperation with Islamic
delegations who wished to provide for their belief that it is not possible for a
child to choose his/her own religious faith.122
Section 3 of the Article is an extension of the right to free thought, conscience
and religion. A child may express his/her beliefs and religion in anyway
he/she sees fit, limited only by considerations of public safety, order, health or
morals or the rights or freedoms of others. The mention of the fundamental
rights of others may allude to the constitutionally recognized fundamental
rights of parents in child-rearing. This would then subject the child's right to
the parent's right where necessary. This interpretation would seem to comport
with the drafters special concern for the Islamic countries.
2. Current U. S. Law
While it is clear that cases such as Tinker accord a child the status of "persons"
protected by constitutional rights, 123 the exercise of those rights in the area of
freedom of religion and conscience is intertwined with the parents' right to
conduct the religious upbringing of their children.1
24
Wisconsin v. Yoder,125 in permitting Amish children to leave school after the
eighth grade, balanced the state's interest in compulsory education with the
121 See discussion supra part VI.
122 Cohen, Introductory Note, supra note 1, at 1451.
123See discussion supra part VfI(A).
124 Even the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, which is
sometimes cited as upholding a child's freedom to express their religious convictions,
was decided on the issue of freedom of expression (a flag salute is a form of utterance).
319 U. S. 624 (1943). The Court determined that possession of a particular religious view
was not relevant in the case in that many citizens, without religious convictions, find
the compulsory flag salute an infringement on their individual liberty. Id. at 634.
125406 U. S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish children have the right to leave school
after the eighth grade contrary to a state compulsory attendance law). The Court found
that requiring the Amish children to attend high school would undermine the Amish
community by exposing the children to values and influences which were contrary to
their religious upbringing. Id. at 211. A more developed discussion of Yoder is contained
in Robert A. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of, in, and for Children, 39 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 118 (Summer 1975).
[Vol. 42:675
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss4/11
U.N. CONVENTION ON RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
parent's right to conduct the religious upbringing of their children. 126 The
partial dissent of Justice William 0. Douglas seems more in keeping with the
spirit of the UNCRC:
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the
inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notions of religious duty
upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to express
potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's
rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.
127
Particularly contrary to the intent of Article 14 is the Court's decision in
Prince v. Massachusetts.128 The Court stated that the state's power to control a
child's conduct reached beyond the states ability to control adult conduct in
the same setting.129 In this particular case the state's child labor and welfare
concerns were sufficient to prevent a child from practicing her own avowed
religion on public streets. 130
As there is nothing in this decision which indicates any concern for the public
health, safety, order or morals, it would appear that such a constraint of a child's
right to manifest his/her religious convictions in this way, would not stand
against the text of Article 14. Noting the propensity of man to attempt to
oppress the expression of unorthodox religious views, Justice Frank Murphy,
in his dissent, stated "Religious freedom is too sacred a right to be restricted or
prohibited in any degree without convincing proof that a legitimate interest of
the state is in grave danger."131 Justice Murphy's position would be in accord
with the position of the UNCRC at least as far as the child's right to manifest
his/her beliefs vis-a-vis the state is concerned.
126 1d. at 213-15.
12 7Id. at 242. Justice Douglas noted that it was the child's future that was affected by
the decision and, in order to give full meaning and substance to the Bill of Rights, lower
courts should be required to canvass the children as to their desires. Id. at 245-46.
128321 U. S. 158 (1944). A statute prohibiting minors (boys under age twelve and girls
under age eighteen) from selling magazines, pamphlets and other literature on the
streets was enforced against the guardian of a nine year old girl when she attempted to
hand out religious tracks in the company of her guardian/Aunt. The girl, her Aunt and
others offered testimony to the fact that it was the girl's personal religious conviction
that she had a duty to perform this work. Id. at 162-63. This testimony was excluded at
trial. Id. The exclusion of such testimonial evidence of the child's personal beliefs also
seems to contravene Article 12, which provides that State Parties shall assure the right
of a child who is old enough to form a view, the opportunity to express that view in all
matters affecting the child and to have that viewpoint given weight in subsequent
determinations in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. UNCRC, supra
note 1, art. 12, § 1, 28 I.L.M. at 1461.
12 9Prince, 321 U. S. at 170.
13 01d. at 168-69. The actual enforcement of the statute was directed against the Aunt.
The law provided penalties against those who give material to children for street sale
and against parents or guardians who permit their children to so sell. Id. at 158.
131Id. at 176.
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To the extent that the cases show a disregard for a child's religious beliefs,
or manifestations of that belief, they are not in keeping with the UNCRC. The
treaty places a child's right to believe and manifest his religion on par with a
parent's right to direct the child. At some point, even the parent's right will fall
since it is subject to the evolving capacities of the child. To avoid the type of
interference in child rearing encompassed by the Convention, any decision
relative to the evolving capacities of the child should rest with the parent unless
there is evidence of severe abuse of this parental function.
D. Children's Rights Under the UNCRC Article 15: Freedom of Association and
Peaceful Assembly
Article 15 of the UNCRC states:
1. States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of
association and to freedom of peaceful assembly.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of these rights
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security or public safety, public order (ordre
public), the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
13 2
1. Linguistic Consideration
The framers of Article 15 utilize the word "recognize" to designate the level
of protection a minor's right to assemble should be accorded. Such a
designation is considered one of the lowest forms of obligation in an
international human rights agreement. 133 In the case of Article 15, the right may
be curtailed only to the degree necessary to protect various public interests.
The level of obligation imposed under Article 5 is of a higher status than that
in Article 15. The parental right would be permitted to prevail over a child's
right to freely assemble at least to the extent that the parental right was
exercised in such a way as to respect the evolving capacities of the child.
2. Current U. S. Law
Litigation involving the right to free assembly has centered around local
curfew regulations imposed upon minors. The law is mixed in-its treatment of
curfew ordinances. The district court in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,134
finding a legitimate state interest in "protecting the moral, emotional, mental,
13 2UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 15, §§ 1-2,28 I.L.M. at 1462.
133 Cohen, Linguistic Interpretation, supra note 53, at 35.
134401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd without op., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U. S. 964 (1976). Justice Marshall with Justice Brennan dissented from the
denial of certiorari for the reason that lower courts were coming to conflicting opinions
as to the issue of "whether the due process rights of juveniles are entitled to lesser
protection that those of adults" in cases involving juvenile curfew laws. 429 U. S. at 965.
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and physical welfare of the minor and the safety, peace, and order of the
community," upheld a curfew regulation.135
However, in Waters v. Barry136 the district court struck down a curfew
ordinance aimed at minors, finding a constitutional violation under the First
and Fifth Amendments. In that decision the court found that the ordinance was
overly broad in restricting the movement of law-abiding minors as well as
those who were potential trouble makers.137 The court further stated, "The right
to walk the streets, or to meet publicly with one's friends for a noble purpose
or for no purpose at all-and to do so whenever one pleases-is an integral
component of life in a free and ordered society."138
In an interesting analysis, the Waters court found that the curfew law,
"[riather than furthering the parental role in child-rearing... frustrat[es] the
parental role in the vast majority of... families."139 To the contrary, the Bykofsky
court found that the ordinance "constitute[d] a minimal interference with the
parental interest in influencing and controlling the activities of their
offspring."140
When a court acts to limit the assembly or free movement rights of juveniles
in the interest of public order or safety, it functions within the perimeters of the
UNCRC. It is worthy to note that if the Waters opinion becomes dominant, a
greater protection to juveniles' right to assemble would be afforded under
United States law than under the UNCRC. 141
135401 F. Supp. at 1257. The ordinance affected minors up to the age of eighteen.
Exceptions were permitted for the minor to exercise his/her First Amendment rights or
when the child was in the company of a parent. The Court found that the supportive
evidence "indicate[d] that the curfew ordinance [made] a substantial contribution to the
alleviation of nocturnal juvenile criminal activity." Id. at 1256. The court also found that
assembly for purely social reasons was not entitled to an exemption for the reason that
governmental interests furthered by the ordinance outweighed the juvenile's rights. Id.
at 1259.
136711 F. Supp 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
13 71d. at 1135.
138Id. at 1134.
1391d. at 1137. Presumably the court means that curfew laws unnecessarily impinge
upon a parent's right to direct the upbringing of children.
14OBykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
141To guarantee that a child is accorded the greatest degree of freedom possible, the
UNCRC, in Article 41, states, "Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any
provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and
which may be contained in: (a) The law of a State Party; or (b) International law in force
for that State." UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 41, 28 I.L.M. at 1472.
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E. Children's Rights Under the UNCRC Article 16: Right of Privacy
Article 16 of the UNCRC states:
1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his or her privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her
honour and reputation.
2. The child has the right to the rotection of the law against
such interference or attacks. V
1. Linguistic Consideration
In a manner similar to that of Article 13, Article 16 is stated in terms having
the highest level of obligation. Lacking as it does any specific limiting clauses,
Article 16 is accorded the highest status among the four civil rights Articles.
However, the Article does not carry an absolute right of privacy. The Article
seems to recognize that some interference will be tolerated. An "unlawful" act
is one which is "contrary to law;... presuppos[ing] that there must be an
existing law ... '143 Unlawful can also refer to an act which is not authorized
by law.144 Therefore, should a privacy interference be permitted by law, and,
at least in this country, that law stands against any constitutional challenges,
the UNCRC would permit it. However, since the parents' rights articulated in
Article 5 carry nowhere near the status of the child's privacy rights in this
Article, it can be questioned whether even lawful interferences with the child's
privacy predicated solely on the parents' right to guide children, would be
permissible under the Convention. This Article also seems to recognize
concepts of family autonomy and sanctity of the home. 145 These are of equal
status with the child's individual right to privacy. Presumably, once a parent is
aware of information otherwise private to the child, the decision-making
process within the family is protected.
2. Current U. S. Law
The United States Constitution does not contain an explicit right of privacy
for adult or minor. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment however, zones of privacy have been judicially developed. 14 6 To
date those rights deemed to be "fundamental" or "implicit within the concept
of ordered liberty" include decision making in the areas of marriage,
142UNCRC, supra note 1, art. 16, §§ 1-2,28 I.L.M. at 1462.
143 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (6th ed. 1990).
144Id.
145Shepherd, supra note 91, at 144.
146Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973). Most cases finding zones of privacy have done
so as the Court in Wade did; that is under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, it
should be noted that a more general privacy right has been suggested in connection
with the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution.
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procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and
education. 147
Children's privacy has been most often explored in relation to the
contraception/abortion rights of minors.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth148 established that a parent does not have the
right to exercise an absolute veto over a child's decision to have an abortion.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld provisions which require either
parental consent or a finding, via a judicial by-pass feature, that the minor is
emancipated or sufficiently mature to give informed consent or, absent that
level of maturity, that it is in the best interests of the minor to permit her to
obtain an abortion.149 Quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota,150 the Court in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey said that the state's parental
consent statute was, "reasonably designed to further the State's important and
legitimate interest 'in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity,
inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to
exercise their rights wisely."'151 In addition, some states require that notice be
given to a parent before an abortion is performed on a minor.152
When a state, by law, requires parental notification for a minor's abortion,
even where the parent is not permitted a veto over the decision, the state may
exceed its authority under the UNCRC. In addition, these interferences with a
147 Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 713 (1976) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319,
325 (1937)). Other zones of privacy have developed in connection with other specific
constitutional guarantees particularly the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments. As
an example in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 483-84 (1965), the Court found
that a zone of privacyprotecting one's associations was created by theFirst Amendment.
148428 U. S. 52 (1976) (striking down a state statute that required parental consent
before an unmarried girl under the age of eighteen could obtain an abortion). The Court
found that a blanket third-party veto against a minor's decision to have an abortion
would not stand constitutional scrutiny simply on the basis that the capacity to make
such a decision might be beyond the capacity of the average juvenile. Id. at 74. However,
Justice Stewart (concurring), noted that a judicial forum for parent-child disputes would
encourage consultation between parents and the child while not permitting a parental
veto and would thus probably withstand constitutional inquiry. Id. at 91 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
149 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.
S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502 (1990);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S.
622 (1979).
150Hodgson, 497 U. S. at 444 (finding, in a 5-4 decision, that a state statute which
required notification of both parents before a minor could receive an abortion was
unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade for the reason that it did not reasonably further any
legitimate state interest).
151Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2802.
152H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 409-10 (1981) (upholding a notice requirement
when the minor neither was found to be emancipated nor insufficiently mature to make
the abortion decision on her own).
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minor's privacy which are permitted in some states and not in others, may be
arbitrary impediments upon the child's right. As such, under the UNCRC, they
would not be permitted.
Apparently, the Convention would require a federal statute regulating
parental consent. The consent process must provide for an alternative to
consent when a minor's best interests include not informing the parent.
Mandatory notification, even on a national level, would not be permitted.
Regulations of this tone would be consistent with the Article 16: the child's
privacy takes precedence over the parent's rights.
Minors have also been accorded privacy rights in connection with
contraception decisions. In 1977, the Supreme Court stated, "[S]ince a State may
not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of parental
consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy ... the
constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives
to minors is a fortiori foreclosed." 153 A state's interest in trying to deter sexual
activity among minors by limiting access to contraceptives is not sufficient to
outweigh the minor's right to privacy.154 This view is in accordance with the
UNCRC. By striking down the state statute, the Court thus determines that this
is not a lawful interference with a child's privacy rights. These privacy
provisions for children under the UNCRC highlight, as do the rights of free
expression, the autonomous nature of the rights accorded children under the
Convention.
IX. CONCLUSION
The primary concern evidenced by this discussion is that children's rights
will be upheld over the rights of parents, particularly in the areas of freedom
of expression and privacy. It is suggested that such autonomy will be
destructive of children's well-being. If concerns over the economic implications
of the Convention or federal-state apprehensions do not dissuade the President
and the Senate from ratification, what protections, in the form of declarations
or reservations, can be put in place to quell these apprehensions?
First, a reservation that the provisions of the Convention in its entirety are
understood to be self-executing will provide for legislative description of the
protections to be afforded children. Any legislation, must withstand
constitutional scrutiny which will bring into play the fundamental rights of
child rearing accorded to parents. A reservation stating the basic nature of
constitutional rights in this country and interpreting Articles 13 through 16 to
be restrictions, not upon parents, but upon the power of the state would remove
a good deal of the apprehension associated with these Articles. As an example,
153Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U. S. 678,679 (1977). A state statute prohibited
the sale or distribution of any contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen as well
as contraceptive distribution to persons sixteen or over by anyone other than licensed
physicians. Id. at 681.
1541d. at 693-94.
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the Holy See155 has attached a reservation stating, "[The Holy See] interprets
the articles of the Convention in a way which safeguards the primary and
inalienable rights of parents, in particular insofar as these rights concern
education (articles 13 and 28), religion (article 14), association with others
(article 15) and privacy (article 16).1"156
A major theme in politics today is family values. Everyone from President
William Clinton to former Vice-President Dan Quayle are actively advocating
the return to family values. For this to be more than rhetoric however, it is
necessary to uphold the family in the legal arena. To permit ratification of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child without explicit,
significant safeguards recognizing the rights of parents and families, would be
to undermine those institutions to the severe detriment of this country's
children.
BARBARA J. NAUCK
155
"The position, authority or court of the Pope." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 868 (Encyclopedic ed. 1977). Denotes the official arm
of the Roman Catholic Church.
1 5 6 UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1992 197 (1993).
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